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This article explores the relationship between the crim inal law and its surround­
ing fields o f knowledge. It focuses on the necessary interaction between the crim­
inal law -  with its requirements o f simplicity and applicability -  and the complex­
ity found in other scientific disciplines that the crim inal law in some way relates 
to. The article introduces the notion o f “representative reduction ’’ as a means fo r 
understanding this kind o f interaction. By using this notion, the article provides 
an account o f how the crim inal law is structurally related to its surrounding 
fie lds o f knowledge. Furthermore, it argues that it can contribute to the interac­
tion between the crim inal law and these fie lds in order to improve the content o f 
the crim inal law. The notion o f representative reduction is in particular exempli­
fie d  and discussed in relation to crim inal responsibility fo r youth. The article also 
addresses some additional aspects o f the overall subject, such as the problem o f 
injustice stemming from  the use o f representative reductions and the role o f the 
crim inal law science in regard to the use o f representative reductions.
1. Introduction
In the following, I w ill provide some reflections on the “nature” o f the concept o f 
crime. More precisely, I w ill address the specific challenges that arise from the 
tension between on the one hand, what we may term a pre-legal complexity and, 
on the other, the need for a distinct kind o f legal sim plification o f this complexity. 
The problem to be addressed could also be formulated as a question regarding the 
relationship between substantive crim inal law and its surrounding knowledge 
fields, like criminology, moral philosophy, psychology and sociology.3 Seen 
apart from in particular Lasson’s and Hagerup’s contributions from past ages, a 
characteristic o f the Norwegian crim inal law science is a certain disinterest in sur­
rounding knowledge fields.4 The pragmatist tradition dominating this discipline 
can in general be said to have dealt w ith this challenge by restricting the attention 
to the legal system and the courts in particular, a solution that entails some prob­
lems. In particular two related problems are worth emphasising.
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First o f all, a core aspect o f modem society is its differentiation into different 
complex subsystems, like economy, politics and law. A  result o f this is also the 
differentiation o f knowledge within these subsystems. One could then expect that 
the world as one sees it is to a large extent the world as seen from ones specific 
point o f view, a basic hermeneutic insight. Ergo: the more differentiated law is in 
modem society, the less reason one has to trust the law itse lf as a reliable source 
o f knowledge o f reality in itself.3 Certainly, in regard to understanding law as part 
o f reality, it is to a large extent necessary to see it “ from within” . But one can’t 
expect to capture the whole o f reality from that point o f view: Even i f  the legal 
system may have the strength o f having over time closely interacted with society 
by means o f concrete cases being brought to the court for adjudication, thus giv­
ing the system an empirical basis for making judgments,6 there is still a signifi­
cant risk that the opinions produced are “adapted” to the existing legal 
knowledge. Secondly, and related, another problem o f the pragmatist approach is 
that it seems to disregard the amount o f knowledge generated within other scien­
tific  disciplines. Given the differentiation also o f the scientific disciplines, we 
face a quite complex set o f different (to some extent competing) conceptual 
schemes seeking to capture parts o f reality. In this perspective, there is no princi­
pled difference between law, sociology, psychology or even philosophy -  it is, as 
I w ill return to, a matter o f different subject-formed perspectives and to some ex­
tent different methods applied in the attempt o f capturing (a part of) reality. In 
sum: this current disinterest in the Norwegian crim inal law doctrine seems to be 
contradicting the pragmatist claim to be in close interaction with society or reality 
as expressed by slogan-style expressions as “ [w]e leave the concepts, and proceed 
directly to reality” .7 I f we maintain that law should be in contact with (a non- 
legal) reality, it seems instead fruitful to start out from that some kind o f a more 
complex interaction between the legal concepts and the surrounding (non-legal) 
sources o f knowledge.
2. The Complexity of Legal Concepts
The concepts o f criminal law have a complex character. On the one hand, it is 
clear that the concepts o f crim inal law frequently have some kind o f pre-legal 
origin, or at least they do have their corresponding concepts in other fields o f 
knowledge. It is sufficient to mention concepts like responsibility, intent or at­
tempts. It is indeed difficult to find concepts in criminal law that are legal sui gen­
eris, i.e. that do not seem to have their origin outside law (the use o f terms related 
to the law, like in “ legality”, “Rechtswidrigkeif’, “Rettsstrid” or similar, is not de­
cisive for a concept being sui generis or not.) In “prescription” one has perhaps
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found an example.8 Given this pre-legal origin o f core concepts in crim inal law, 
many hold it as necessary that these concepts at least in some manner build upon 
their pre-legal background. Illustrative is the great interest in philosophy found in 
Western criminal law literature. It is d ifficu lt for instance to understand the legal 
concept o f intention without taking into account the (use o f the) concept o f inten­
tion as part o f the moral language. (Thereby I do not imply that the legal concept 
o f intention can be h illy  reduced to a pre-legal phenomenon. That is obviously not 
the case.) And Hagerup, for instance, strongly emphasised the necessity o f psycho­
logical insights in order to capture essential aspects o f crim inal law. The opposite 
view has o f course also its prominent proponents. Still, this pre-legal orientation is, 
given that one starts out from the principle o f guilt, or a “personal-functional” po­
sition, and that I think one should do, well-argued. Generally, i f  one wants to set 
up (legal) criteria for making judgements on other people’s actions, one has to start 
out from some kind o f pre-legal understanding o f what is involved in performing 
an action. Hence, even i f  the interest in the concept o f action may from time to 
time vary, this concept could not at any time be allowed to go fully out o f style.
On the other hand, legal concepts are at the same time legal concepts and as 
such distinct in regard to moral philosophical or psychological concepts and so 
forth: The concepts o f crim inal law do have their distinct characteristics that dis­
tinguish them from their pre-legal basis. In this regard, the most basic characteris­
tic is that the concepts o f crim inal law have their location within a legal system 
that is fundamentally orientated towards the binary code o f legal/illegal. I w ill not 
go much further into the nature o f this binary code and its background here.9 
Briefly, the distinction between legal and illegal excludes the possibility o f modi­
fications (“a-bit-illegal”) w ithin the legal system. I f something is not illegal, it is 
legal, however illegal-like it is. This core aspect o f law is closely related to the 
possibility o f filling  the core functions o f the legal system, including the crim inal 
justice system. For instance, one such function is to insert “predictability” in d if­
ferent social spheres in regard to what one is allowed to do and what one is not 
allowed to do (without facing certain consequences). The possibility o f filling  this 
function is to a large extent dependent on unambiguous rules and a complex insti­
tutional structure where, in case o f disagreement, certain decisions-makers have a 
final say on the interpretation and application o f the rule -  and does so within rea­
sonable time. (In a sense, one may therefore say that the subject we address is 
part o f the relation between substantial crim inal law and crim inal procedure, and 
then in particular the impact o f the latter on the former.10) In this regard, there are 
clear differences to other norm-systems, for instance morality.
48
Concepts o f C rim inal Law  and Representative Reductions
Before proceeding, we should, however, somewhat nuance this starting point 
by pointing to that the binary code is to a large extent capable o f containing me­
diating sub-distinctions, for instance between “ illegal, but not crim inal” and “ ille ­
gal and crim inal”, or between “not criminal/) ustified” and “not-criminal/ex- 
cused” , without violating the basic code itself, a point that I w ill return to. Also, 
the principles o f sentencing mediate the rigidity o f the legal code, to some extent 
dependent on which principles o f sentencing that one follows.
In ordinary life, o f course, the idea o f a binary code in regard to for instance 
the development o f youths and their capacity for responsible action would indeed 
be comical. Here, we can cope very well with seeing responsibility for youths as 
a long-time and complex process, which includes also individual experiences and 
the present state o f social institutions like education, where one (normally) devel­
ops from being a child into a fu lly responsible grown up. The complexity o f this 
process is well documented in child- and youth psychology.11 A lso ascription o f 
moral responsibility is usually adjusted in accordance with this complexity. How­
ever, the crim inal law could hardly function with such a solution. In crim inal law, 
we instead find, usually motivated by “ legal technical reasons” , a quite strict line 
-  in Norway, according to section 46 in the Crim inal Code o f 1902, 15 years.1" 
This line allows for no further discussion on the factual capacities o f the individ­
ual; everyone that is 15 years or more is considered to have the sufficient respon­
sibility-capacity, and all those that are not yet 15 years do not have it. It could 
here be mentioned that the Crim inal Code o f 1842 made use o f a more differenti­
ated solution: Here one had an absolute lim it at the age o f 10, while, in regard to 
children between 10 and 15 years, one was supposed to individually consider 
whether he or she had “realised the crim inal nature o f the act” , i.e. to make a 
judgement on the specific moral capacity o f the individual.13 It does not take 
much to see the problems that arise from such a legal criterion, in terms o f d iffi­
culties for the court to judge on the basis o f such a criterion, but also the accom­
panying potential for power-abuse and inequality. Or stated differently, the only 
way to handle such a complex reference would be to exchange it into some more 
general standards for making the judgement. As this example illustrates, this ten­
sion between a pre-legal complexity and the legal need for sim plification is par­
ticularly pressing within the category o f “guilt”  or “personal” requisites for crim­
inal responsibility, in particular those that relate to the constitution, capacities, 
character or what term we here should apply, o f the individual.
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3. Introducing “Representative Reductions”
3.1. Starting Points concerning Representative Reductions 
How then to mediate between a pre-legal complexity and the crim inal law ’s 
seemingly profound need for a more precise criterion?14 A  basic starting point, it 
seems, would be “representative reductions” : We must, on the one hand, precise­
ly reduce the pre-legal complexity -  itse lf resisting a simple and strict categorisa­
tion -  into an operational criterion that satisfies the basic binary code.13 By sepa­
rating between not having responsibility-capacity and having it by means o f a 
strict age lim it, we make a, in this case quite far-reaching, reduction. In the litera­
ture, as in Andenæs, this is explained by references to “ legal technical reasons” : 
“There is o f course no change o f personality in the moment a person is 15 years. 
And the time o f maturity differs from individual to individual; a boy or a girl at 
13 or 14 years may have reached the same level o f maturity as somebody else at 
the age o f 15 or 16. But there has to be one lim it, and due to legal technical rea­
sons this lim it is set at a certain age without any question o f level o f maturity.” 16
This explanation o f “ legal technical reasons” could clearly be taken as refer­
ring to the mentioned legal code o f legal/illegal (criminal/not criminal). But why 
there must be a lim it is only the first question. The additional question is why the 
lim it is, or should be, set as it is. I f the need for a clear criterion for deciding be­
tween cases was the only matter, then this criterion could be satisfied by a huge 
number o f solutions here (5 years, 10 years, 15 years and so on), and critique o f 
some solutions, as when Per Ole Traskman criticised EC H R ’s acceptance o f two 
ten years old kids being held crim inal responsible for murder in England, would 
not be particularly meaningful.17 But clearly there is more at stake than just hav­
ing a strict line in itself.
In order to identify why the line is set where it is, we should understand the 
solution as an attempt to in some manner make the reduction mirror or represent 
pre-legal knowledge on the subject. Legal thinking draws here upon on a com­
mon feature o f human intellectual life. The mechanism described is exclusive to 
the legal system, but is rather a more common feature in human life, i.e. reduction 
o f complexity. To make an example (also o f relevance to the crim inal law): In 
daily life  we frequently ascribe each other certain characters, both as individuals 
(John is a kind man, Tom is a devil, Anna is lovely) and as groups (people in 
Bergen are loud speakers, youths today are rude). The ascription o f a certain 
character to someone is usually an operation o f a representative reduction. For 
instance, when ascribing John the character o f kindness, the case could be that 
one even has some experience o f him not being kind (losing his temper, swear­
ing, and when drunk, he even hit his ex-wife’s new man), but one disregards this
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information in ascribing him the character o f kindness due to experience o f John 
taking care o f his sick mother, being a good father to his kids, showing care to an­
imals, donating money in emergencies, being a dedicated and competent pediatri­
cian, etc. The example illustrates at the same time that a representative reduction 
is not the same as inductive reasoning (going from “every swan I have seen have 
been white” to “all swans are white”). Even i f  both are a kind o f generalisation, 
the inductive inference is (disregarded the problems connected with such reason­
ing) dependent on the premises not being changed (the observation o f one or 
more black swan(s)). A  representative reduction has rather the structure sim ilar to
(y i +  x i+  y2 + y 3 +  y» + ys +ye + x 2) =  y
(y = good deed, x = wrongdoing)
Even i f  one adds another x to the premises, the outcome may still be y. But also, 
the introduction o f one single z (= serious wrongdoing) may change the outcome: 
A  mother has done much good to her child (“a good mother” )), but then at inten­
tionally commits a serious crime to it, for instance an incident o f sexual abuse. 
This added fact is capable o f changing the outcome (“not a good mother”). The 
representative reduction can in other words not be understood purely quantitative. 
One could say that representative reductions are sim ilar to what in ordinary lan­
guage is termed an (adequate) impression o f something.
3.2. “Programming the Code ”
In order to make (or understand or evaluate) a representative reduction we are 
first o f all in need o f a “perspective” , a “programme” for the legal code, in order 
to identify the relevant pre-legal material. There are basically three different lines 
o f argument, each dependent on a motivation o f setting the age lim it at a certain 
age. One can claim 1) that the age lim it is motivated by arguments o f general de­
terrence, for instance that one has to be more than 15 years old to be affected by 
the threat o f punishment, or 2) that the age lim it is motivated by humanitarian ar­
guments, i.e., one experiences it as brutal, damaging, insensitive (etc.) to punish 
children and youths not yet aged 15, and hence does not want to do it (even i f  this 
group o f offenders are principally crim inally responsible), or 3) that children and 
youth younger than 15 lack prerequisites for being held crim inally responsible in 
the sense that this is a distinct kind o f moral responsibility.
Now, from my point o f view, the only sustainable argument is the last one. 
The argument o f general deterrence is frequently used in attempts to motivate this
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and sim ilar criteria for crim inal responsibility. The underlying premise is that 
some groups (youths and insane persons) cannot take the threat o f punishment 
into account at the time o f acting, and that the threat thereby is useless and, given 
the underlying utilitarian aim o f general deterrence, not motivated. This is how­
ever, as Hart made clear in regard to Bentham’s sim ilar argumentation, a non se- 
quitur}* Even if  it these persons were not capable o f taking the threat into ac­
count at the time o f action (a questionable empirical premise in regard to youths 
at least), this does not mean that one would not get an increased overall general 
deterrent effect by punishing also youths and insane persons.
The second line o f arguing, the argument o f humanity, is in itself valid. And it 
is also frequently used in current discussions on juvenile justice. But it is not a 
quite satisfactory explanation o f why one has used such a general lower age lim it 
for being held crim inally responsible and punished. Or to put it somewhat differ­
ently, the argument o f humanity may probably go as a motivation for not impris­
oning a youth, but it is more d ifficu lt to see why it is inhuman to fine them. One 
could make use o f sim ilar solutions as in tort law without the system being “ in­
human” for that reason.
The strength o f the last line o f arguing does not only stem from the insuffi­
ciency o f the two other lines o f arguing. Rather the argument o f a lacking prereq­
uisite for crim inal responsibility seems to have some kind o f priority in regard to 
the two others. Unless one accepts a utilitarian point o f view, the argument o f 
utility must be qualified or lim ited by the person being punished deserving pun­
ishment.19 And the same goes for the argument o f inhumanity. It seems strange to 
argue for abstaining from punishing due to arguments o f humanity if  one does not 
acknowledge the right to punish the relevant (group of) individual(s) in the first 
place. This argument is closely tied to a certain concept o f crim inal responsibility, 
i.e. one starting out from the principle o f guilt.
The principle o f guilt implies that there are close references between moral 
and crim inal responsibility. In this text, the principle o f guilt is taken as a core 
premise for the entire understanding o f crim inal law. The argument in the follow ­
ing w ill therefore start out from this principle, a starting point that w ill colour the 
discussion o f the representative reduction. But it should be added that speaking o f 
representative reductions is not conditioned by this starting point. A lso, i f  one ra­
ther advocates another line o f argument in regard to the motivation o f the age 
lim it, the need for making a representative reduction remains (at which age do 
one in general become able to take in the threat o f punishment into account, or at 
which age is it no longer in general inhuman to punish someone?). In regard to
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these questions the material is also so complex that one does not avoid the reduc­
tion and the claim for it being representative.
3.3. Making it Representative
3.3.1. Basic Starting Points fo r Making it Representative
By now we may return to the representative reduction concerning youth’s (pre- 
legal) capacities for responsibility. Here, there are several sources and viewpoints 
to consider, for instance child- and youth-psychology, sociology and (empirical) 
criminology. And also the legal system has its own knowledge o f the subject that 
is to be taken into account: To the extent that the courts are assigned to complete 
the rule, as they frequently are assigned to do in regard to concepts w ithin the 
concept o f crime, like for instance the concept o f mens rea, they do so partly by 
reference to general knowledge held by the decision maker herself who is not on­
ly a system participant but also a person in itself, and partly by reference to the 
experiences o f the legal system itself. I w ill return to these different sources o f 
knowledge below. The important point so far, is that in regard to the capacity o f 
youths to be responsible for their actions, there is massive material giving a quite 
complex scheme o f viewpoints that reject any simple answer as to whether or 
when youths are responsible for their actions. And it is o f importance to underline 
that we are not capable o f fixing one point or one perspective as the representa­
tive or the “original”  one for the pre-legal sphere. Rather we find a complex o f 
different perspectives or theories that sometimes underpin each other, sometimes 
overlap and sometimes even contradict each other. The “ordinary life experi­
ence” , in Norwegian crim inal law literature often expressed as “common sense” 
is also only one such perspective.
How then to perform the reduction in order for it to be representative? “Repre­
sentative reductions” are not a method to be operated like a mathematical formu­
la: Crim inologists and psychologists would rightfully be sceptic about the possi­
b ility o f making such a (strict) reduction o f their knowledge on the subject, not to 
mind when grouped together w ith others! On the other hand, new or revised 
viewpoints in these discussions cannot simply be “ implemented” into the system 
o f legal knowledge which is dependent on a certain kind o f spatiotemporal stabil­
ity (see further below). What is addressed here is instead (first o f all) a way to 
conceive the structure between the legal discourse and crim inological, psycho­
logical discourses and so on, a structure that is complicated by the role o f ordi­
nary life, also as a possible mid-station for this exchange.2"
But even if  we cannot think in terms o f a precise method, there is also a basic 
practical potential in “representative reductions” . A t the same time as it allows us
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to respect the increasingly distinct and non-transferrable complexity o f different 
discourses in regard to each other, it also makes it possible to evaluate the solu­
tions in crim inal law, and it makes it meaningful for us to let other knowledge 
fields “ irritate” the law in order for a successive adjustment o f the solutions o f 
crim inal law into a more “representative” solution -  but still in law ’s own terms. 
Hence, representative reductions are not only a descriptive enterprise, capturing a 
mechanism already in play, but also a normative enterprise, as it by the extrapola­
tion o f this mechanism seeks to contribute to the increased and improved use o f 
it.
The underlying premise here is that despite law ’s claim o f making representa­
tive reductions o f the pre-legal complexity, the legal system is not always suc­
cessful in performing its representative reductions in a proper manner. Unsuc­
cessful representations, or non-representative reductions, are also found within 
the legal system.21 Critical viewpoints such as Traskman’s presuppose the (poten­
tial) existence o f such non-representative reductions. The occurrence o f non­
representative reductions is, however, not a problem for the idea o f representative 
reductions in itself, but only for the way this operation has been preformed. Even 
though there is in law a legitimate time-delay-mechanism in regard to the devel­
opment in surrounding fields o f knowledge, it is obvious that the legal system 
does not always respond quickly enough to such changes -  either at a more ter­
m inological or also at a more substantial level. This tendency has, in part, to do 
with the fact that law is a knowledge system w ith internal requirements o f coher­
ence, but can also partly be ascribed to the fact that such an update o f the legal 
system requires the activation o f the legislative procedure, and, in consequence, 
requiring both political support and financial means. But sometimes it is being 
done. One example in this regard is the update on the Norwegian rules on what 
that is to count as sufficient mental illness for being excused for a crime.22
Despite the lack o f a “method” in regard to the practical use o f the notion o f 
representative reductions, certain guiding principles, at least in an ideal situation, 
can be listed. Ceteris paribus
-  experiences from ordinary life have a high value due to their empirical and in­
dividual character (a cognitive mechanism);
-  scientific investigations have high value due to their methodological qualities 
(rationality-principle 1);
-  scientific investigations that take place w ithin a discipline that is committed to 
studying the relevant object should have higher value than investigations that 
take place w ithin a discipline that is not committed to the relevant object (psy-
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chological studies o f psychological elements have higher value than investiga­
tions in law touching on psychological premises in regard to the psychological 
elements (rationality-principle 2);
-  knowledge held in one field o f science has higher value i f  it is supported by 
the knowledge held in other fields o f science (rationality-principle 3, in partic­
ular to be combined with principle 2);
-  recent scientific investigations have higher value than older scientific investi­
gations (rationality-principle 4);
-  knowledge valid over time have higher value than knowledge recently devel­
oped (rationality-principle 5);
-  A  scientific investigation has higher value the more often it has been con­
firmed by other investigations (rationality-principle 6).
The situation is, however, not always that law is not-up-to-date in regard to 
knowledge produced in other fields o f knowledge. Sometimes the understanding 
o f a phenomenon in other disciplines is non liquet, while law (as a political in­
strument) is in dire need to progress the scientific discussion and make a stand on 
a certain problem (for instance certain environmental problems). How the crim i­
nal law can adequately perform its representative reductions in regard to phe­
nomena which are clouded by uncertainty in other sciences, are a complex matter 
that is not possibly given a simple answer to. A s a starting point: There w ill most 
often at least to some extent be some kind o f uncertainty in the scientific 
knowledge production to be taken into account in the law ’s representative reduc­
tions. The number o f possible or acceptable legal solutions w ill be as a starting 
point proportional to the degree o f doubt concerning the phenomenon (given that 
the legal decision could not be suspended), a starting point that must be supple­
mented by for instance a risk-principle and more.
3.3.2. The Temporal Dimension
This operation o f representative reductions w ithin the legal system cannot, how­
ever, be fu lly conceived from such a spatial (at a certain point o f time knowledge 
representative) dimension only: To this, we have to add the important temporal 
dimension. Here, it is useful to start by pointing to the fact that, without presup­
posing a stream-line improvement, different kinds o f such sources o f knowledge 
continuously develop and (hopefully) improve in regard to the opinions held. 
This is in particular the case for the different scientific disciplines. A t the same 
time, new insights are frequently overemphasised; what was first propagated as a 
“new truth” came rather to be an additional aspect o f the existing knowledge that
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makes the existing knowledge richer, more nuanced and more complex, and even 
rejects some parts o f it. The humanities and the social sciences have proved less 
capable o f resisting this tendency, with several examples o f scientific enthusiasm 
over new insights being turned into an undisciplined “complete domination” o f 
this viewpoint. The fate o f the postmodernism and its different branches is the 
most recent example.23 The legal science is o f course not unaffected by such in­
tellectual trends. A lso the history o f the concept o f crime mirrors the same over­
enthusiasm and one-sidedness.
For the legal system, however, such swift and extreme shifts o f opinions pose 
a potential problem: Law  is given its normative and system-theoretical require­
ments necessarily dependent on a greater stability, often expressed in terms o f a 
kind o f “conservatism” , which forces it to maintain more reluctant towards such 
paradigmatic shifts. And this, it should be added, should not only be seen as a 
weakness o f the legal system. It thereby also becomes more immune to hasty and 
ungrounded radicalism. But the lack o f openness does create challenges in regard 
to the communication with other knowledge systems; it is by means o f this “ con­
servatism” that the legal system seems to have some difficulties in interacting 
with or exchanging knowledge with other knowledge systems. The notion o f 
(spatiotemporal) representative reductions o f the existing available knowledge is 
the solution o f the legal system to this problem.
4. The General Relevance of Representative Reductions: The Concept of 
Person
Now  the example o f the age lim it for crim inal responsibility for youths is a very 
clear-cut one, one that one does not find too many examples of. However, it 
seems as the phenomenon o f representative reductions itself is o f more general 
relevance to concepts o f crim inal law, even i f  in more subtle ways. Such reduc­
tions can for instance be claimed to be traced in (but not fu lly determining) fig­
ures like the “general, reasonable person”, which for instance is central to the 
concept o f negligence. Hence, as already signalled, the representative reduction is 
not only a matter o f empirical premises. The crim inal law is expressing moral 
blame, and requires that the norm somehow in a sense is also a moral norm, how­
ever without being identical to the moral discussion and its outcome. Seen from 
the perspective o f the representative reduction the relationship between the crim i­
nal law and morality could be expressed in the follow ing manner:
1) From a moral point o f view, the act is, as it belongs to a certain act-type, pri-
ma facie  blameworthy, but the moral discussion is always open, in lack o f any
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other authority than reason, therefore the prima facie judgement could be sus­
pended by further arguments;
2) From a moral-criminal law perspective (a “Begriindungsperspektive”), the act 
is (made) crim inal because the act-type is commonly taken to be morally 
blameworthy;
3) From a formal legal point o f view, the act is crim inal as it fu lfils the criteria 
for being a crime.
When we start out from this perspective o f representative reductions and then 
construct a more abstract concept o f the different criteria for crim inal responsibil­
ity we seem to arrive at something like the legal person, or what Radbruch termed 
“Der Mensch im Recht” : “nicht der w irkliche Mensch, sondem das B ild  des 
Menschen, das dem Recht vorschwebt und auf das es seine Anordnungen ein- 
richtet” .24 We are different as individuals, but being a person is a distinct status in 
a political community. “Person”  is in other words an abstract concept, or, i f  pre­
ferred, an abstract representative reduction o f the class o f individuals. It is, in the 
end, this status as a person which determine our protected sphere and which is the 
source o f our legal obligations. Drawing on the etymological origin o f the term, 
originally a term for the actor’s mask, the legal concept o f person is, so to speak, 
a mask making us basically sim ilar to the law.23
So, the perspective o f representative reductions allows us to see the concept o f 
person in law as something more substantial than “an artificial aid o f thought” , as 
Kelsen claimed it to be, rejecting the idea o f the concept o f person in law as refer­
ring to some kind o f pre-legal phenomenon. Already in the first edition o f Reine 
Rechtslehre, he claimed to have cleared the way for
“ ... recognizing the concept o f legal subject or person as simply an artificial aid to thought, a 
heuristic concept created by legal cognition -  under the pressure o f a personifying, anthropo­
morphic legal language -  in order to illustrate the data to be dealt with. “Person”  is simply a per­
sonifying expression for the unit) o f a bundle o f legal obligations and legal rights, that is, the 
unify o f a complex o f norms. And this insight protects against the misleading hypostatizations 
that [in failing to distinguish between the legal and biological-psychological concepts o f person] 
have the effect o f doubling the law qua object o f cognition.”26
It is correct that the nexus o f legal norms, w ith inherent representative reductions, 
contributes substantially to the construction o f the concept o f person. But still the 
construction o f the concept o f the person from the nexus o f legal norms with its 
inherent representative reductions by necessity imports pre-legal knowledge, in 
the end anchoring also the legal concept o f person in law in the pre-legal sphere.
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Stated differently; the legal concept o f person, including its inherent pre-legal 
premises, is not only a means for systematising legal norms, but plays also a part 
in the establishing o f the rule.
A t the same time, we also arrive at a more concrete expression o f this status 
than expressions sometimes found in political philosophy, for instance in Kant’s 
definition o f persons as “dasjenige Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung 
fähig sind” .27 From the point o f view o f crim inal law; as long as we are more than 
15 years old (or sim ilar limit), not suffering from severe psychical deficits like 
psychosis and not being in a situation that heavily puts us under pressure, we are 
taken to possess a capacity o f moral autonomy, i.e. to acknowledge certain basic 
moral principles and to control our actions in accordance with them.28 Hence, the 
crim inal law seems in this regard to be a link between the empirical complexity 
o f individuals and some basics principles o f Western moral and political philoso­
phy (with its own underlying complexity and contestation). In this regard, how­
ever, there seems to be a need for a mediator between law’s positivity and for in­
stance the philosophical discussion. This observation calls for some remarks con­
cerning the role o f the crim inal law science, and the crim inal law doctrine 
(Strafrechtsdogmatik) in particular, in regard to the law ’s operation o f representa­
tive reductions.
5. The Role of the Criminal Law Doctrine in Regard to Representative 
Reductions
The crim inal law doctrine is at the same time located in two distinct knowledge 
systems, law/criminal law and science. On the one hand, the crim inal law doc­
trine must relate to the code o f law and the positivity o f legal rules when it seeks 
to perform its main task, the systematisation o f the existing legal rules by means 
o f conceptual systems. However, as a scientific discipline, the legal doctrine 
stands not only under the code o f the legal system, but also under the code o f the 
sciences: Where correctness under the code o f law is to a certain extent depend­
ent on the decision o f the relevant decision makers (legislator, Supreme Court), 
correctness in the scientific field is defined by some universal standards o f argu­
mentation with rationality or truth as its aim. Sometimes this is seen as a problem 
for the legal doctrine, including the crim inal law doctrine, calling for it to serve 
two, and at times conflicting masters.
It could, however, also be seen as a potential for the crim inal law doctrine, 
w ith an obvious capacity to make complex statements that distinguish between 
legal and scientific “ correctness” (the correct legal interpretation o f the legal rule 
r  would be ru while the most well-reasoned solution to the legal problem, given
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an underlying theory o f the crim inal law, would be r2). This differentiation could 
also be applied in regard to the representative reductions. A s a legal rule, the 
crim inal law doctrine would have to present it as it is reduced in the legal system, 
i.e. as valid law according to the doctrine o f legal sources (15 years). A t the same 
time, the crim inal law doctrine, standing also under the code o f science, could 
not, as opposed to the lawyer or judge, be content with this legal interpretation. It 
must also go on to inquire into whether the positive (claimed-to-be) representa­
tive reduction in fact is a representative reduction, i.e. to inquire into the pre-legal 
basis in order to be able to judge on the representativeness o f the relevant reduc­
tion, either by own inquiries or by means o f cross-disciplinary cooperation. I f  the 
positive reduction proves to be inadequate or not representative, the crim inal law 
scientist w ill be obliged to add this sim ilar to the statement above; “youths are 
crim inally responsible from the age o f 15, however, the most well-reasoned solu­
tion to the question o f responsibility o f youths would, when taking recent crim i­
nological and psychological research into consideration, be to set the lim it al­
ready at 13 years” .
By means o f such more complex statements regarding the crim inal responsi­
bility o f youths, the crim inal law science can interact with such surrounding fields 
o f knowledge without disintegrating into the relevant discipline and thereby 
maintain its relevance to the legal system in regard to the interpretation o f the cur­
rent valid legal rules. Thus, the crim inal law science is able to contribute to a 
higher level o f legitimacy o f the legal system. This prevents the legal concepts 
from becoming the “world itse lf’ from a legal point o f view -  an intellectual tyr­
anny o f the legal code, and keeps the crim inal law related to the life-world. This 
distinct transformation o f knowledge into the legal system can only be performed 
by the legal science. Hence, Lasson’s and Hagerup’s emphasis on the relevance 
o f surrounding fields o f knowledge is well-argued.
6. The Legitimacy of Criminal Law: The Problem of Injustice
The perspective o f “representative reductions” is, as just signalled, a gateway to 
the question o f the legitimacy o f crim inal law. There is a manifest difference be­
tween making use o f representative reductions in order to orient oneself in ordi­
nary life, and making use o f them as the basis for holding someone crim inally re­
sponsible and to punish him or her. This generates the pressing problem o f injus­
tice: Could one, starting out from a personal-functional position, live w ith ascrib­
ing responsibility and distribute punishment from such representative reductions 
and their possible misconception o f the relevant individual?
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First o f all, this question gives us the opportunity to somewhat modify the 
starting point made above. The concepts o f crim inal law are elements in a norm- 
system. Even if, for instance, the level o f moral development o f the individual 
called to account is suggesting that she is not capable o f being responsible, this is 
not necessary decisive for the formation o f the norm: There is a complex relation­
ship between “can” and “ought” . A  claim that “ought” presupposes “ can” may be 
countered by Kant’s words: “Daß der Mensch sich bewußt ist, er könne dieses, 
weil er es solT ’ -  “That he knows he can do this because he ought to” .29 A  com­
mon aim o f norms and norm systems, including the crim inal law, is precisely to 
improve our behaviour where it is likely that we else would do wrong. Hence, 
Kant’s sentence may to some extent be a proper rejection o f certain kinds o f less 
impressive (claimed-to-be) excuses. However, this does not take us very far, be­
cause what we are discussing here is in the end the capacity for “ self-legislation” , 
i.e. whether he at all knows, or can know, that he ought to do it. A lso here, one 
might claim that for instance youths to some extent earlier come to develop their 
moral capacities in a community w ith normative expectations to them than what 
they would do in a community without such expectations. But here there is due to 
biological and psychological reasons clearly a lim ited potential for speeding up 
maturity and transgressing individual hindrances for it. And i f  for instance neuro­
science would at some point do away w ith the idea o f a free w ill as a foundational 
premise for responsibility, then also the crim inal law would have to acknowledge 
this, even if  it would be devastating for the entire concept o f crim inal law as we 
here have understood it.30
In the end, then, there seems to be no other solution to this problem o f injus­
tice than to point to the “ functional”  dimension o f crim inal law and the personal- 
functional position, i.e. point to the fact that the crim inal law is first and foremost 
a legal, not primary a moral phenomenon, even if  these are closely related. And 
the legal enterprise is, in order for it to fu lfil its functions as a supplement and 
support to morality, conditioned by the complex working premises o f modem so­
ciety.31 Hence, in order to have a crim inal justice system that serves certain aims 
and which is in accordance with some basic rule-of-law-guarantees, the price we 
have to pay is, to put it somewhat tendentiously, to accept to be treated as persons 
not as individuals by the crim inal justices system. The alternative seems to be to 
change to some kind o f individualised restorative justice-solution. Here, however, 
there are some likely problems concerning lacking deterrent effect and the poten­
tial disregard for basic rule o f law-guarantees and so on, so this is no bullet-proof 
alternative and not even one preferable to the modem crim inal justice system.
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The negative effects o f making use o f functionally-motivated representative 
reductions could, however, be somewhat lim ited by emphasising the principle o f 
optimal differentiation. The (potential) conflict or tension between a fair moral 
judgement o f the act and the need for making use o f representative reductions 
must, in the crim inal law, be reduced by constructing the crim inal law by means 
o f morally relevant differentiations to the extent possible w ithin the functional 
requirements o f the code and its representative reductions. W hile the crim inal law 
has less possibility to be nuanced in regard to the distinction between legal/not 
legal, or not criminal/criminal, it has a totally different potential for differentia­
tion and different categorisations within the functional requirements o f the legal 
code. The scope o f the special part is one example o f this ability. This principle o f 
optimal differentiation is o f fundamental importance to the concept o f crime and 
core distinctions between completed crimes, attempts -  completed attempts vs. 
not completed attempts -  and preparatory acts, between perpetrator and accom­
plice and so on.32 Here, the principle o f optimal differentiation is also a strong ar­
gument, for instance, for insisting on the distinction between justification and ex­
cuse found in particular in German crim inal law doctrine, but unfortunately not 
emphasised in the Norwegian crim inal law doctrine.
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